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What works in attracting and retaining teachers in 
challenging schools and areas?
Beng Huat See a, Rebecca Morris b, Stephen Gorard a and Nada El Soufia
aSchool of Education, Durham University, Durham, UK; bCentre for Education Studies, Warwick University, 
Warwick, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper describes a systematic review of international research 
evidence identifying the most promising approaches to attracting 
and retaining teachers in hard-to-staff areas. Only empirical studies 
that employed a causal or suitable comparative design and had robust 
measurements of recruitment and retention outcomes were consid-
ered. Studies were assessed for strength of evidence taking into 
account threats to trustworthiness which may bias the results. A search 
of 13 electronic databases and Google/Google scholar identified 20 
distinct research reports that met the inclusion criteria. Financial incen-
tives was the only approach that seemsto work in attracting teachers 
to challenging schools, but not effective in retaining them. To keep 
teachers working in challenging schools a supportive and conducive 
working environment would be needed. Other approaches such as 
mentoring, support, or teacher development do not have strong 
evidence of effectiveness, largely because much of the research on 
these approaches was weak. More robust research capable of addres-
sing causal questions is therefore urgently required to determine their 
impact in attracting and retaining good teachers in areas where they 
are most needed. Long-term solution would be to change school- 
allocation policies and improve economic conditions in such areas so 
that the problem of staffing does not arise.
KEYWORDS 
Teacher recruitment and 
retention; hard-to-staff 
schools; financial incentives; 
systematic review
Background
Education systems worldwide attempt to provide good quality education for their citizens, 
and this requires a supply of high-quality teachers. Supply has reportedly become more 
difficult in recent times because of challenges in recruiting and retaining teachers. Widespread 
media reports of teacher shortages both in England (Boffey & Helm, 2015; Hazell, 2018; Sky 
News, 2017) and the US (e.g. Garcia & Weiss, 2019) have dominated newspaper headlines in 
the last few years.
In England (Foster, 2019; TES Global, 2019) and the US (Sutcher et al., 2016) teacher 
shortages are predicted to get worse as pupil population is rising and more teachers in 
the profession are leaving before retirement. But for some schools and regions this overall 
shortage of supply is more serious because they are already facing great difficulties in 
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attracting and retaining teachers by virtue of their undesirable location and student 
intake (House of Commons, 2017).
Attracting and retaining suitably qualified teachers in some subjects and geogra-
phical areas is a challenge common to the school staffing policies of many developed 
countries (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018). Teacher shortages related to 
the remoteness of some regions are mentioned in half of the countries that partici-
pated in the European Commission survey. In other countries, it was the high cost of 
living and high proportion of disadvantaged pupils in some large urban cities (such as 
Brussels and London) that reportedly made it difficult to attract and retain teachers.
In England, there are geographical cold spots where schools are rated as least likely to 
have teachers in shortage subjects with a relevant degree. In coastal rural areas, which can 
be highly deprived, 7% of secondary teachers are unqualified, compared with 4.6% in more 
affluent inland rural areas (Social Mobility Commission, 2017). Regionally, the North East, 
West Midlands and East of England are less likely to have teachers with a relevant degree 
teaching shortage subjects compared to London. For example, only 17% of physics teachers 
in poorer schools outside London have a relevant degree, compared with 52% in affluent 
areas in the rest of the country (Sibieta, 2018).
In the House of Commons (2017) 5th Report on teacher recruitment and retention, the 
government acknowledged that there were wide regional variations in teacher supply. 
While there have been plans to encourage more teachers to work in areas most in need, 
these have not been very successful. The pilot for a National Teaching Service, for example, 
which was set up to get teachers to teach in areas most struggling to recruit, had to be 
abandoned after managing to recruit only 54 of 1,500 intended teachers (Hazell, 2016).
Most education systems in the world use similar strategies in their efforts to attract and 
retain teachers in hard-to-staff schools and for some high demand subjects. Among these 
are financial incentives, such as bursaries and scholarships (e.g. DfE, 2019a). Since 2018/19, 
the government in England has been piloting the early-career payments for some short-
age subject teachers and a student loan reimbursement for science and language 
teachers in some local authorities to incentivise such teachers to stay in the profession 
(Foster, 2019). Other strategies being used in many countries also include alternative 
certification and mentoring and induction or support for new teachers. For example, the 
DfE in England has introduced an Early Career Framework to be rolled out in 
September 2020 in some challenging areas (DfE, 2019b).
Most of these programmes have not been robustly evaluated. Although the use of 
monetary inducements has been tested in a number of studies, especially in the US, there 
is so far no synthesis of the research findings, so the evidence of their effectiveness is still 
unclear. These incentives are expensive and it would be a waste of taxpayers’ money and 
the country’s resources to continue using them if there is no evidence that they work. There 
is also an opportunity cost as the money used for these incentives could be otherwise 
channelled to more effective programmes. If they show promise it is important to know how 
they can best be implemented, and the extent to which they can be deployed in other 
countries facing similar challenges. It is therefore crucial that these strategies are robustly 
evaluated and tested before more money is spent on them worldwide.
As far as we know, this is the first large-scale comprehensive single-study review of 
teacher recruitment and retention policies to addressing teacher shortages in hard-to- 
staff areas/schools. Previous reviews often do not consider the reliability of the evidence 
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and design of research in their evaluation (e.g. Wheeler & Glennie, 2007). This paper 
summarises the findings of a systematic review of empirical research to identify the most 




This review was part of a larger review that addresses teacher recruitment and retention 
(R&R) issues in general. For this paper we identified and analysed those relevant to R&R in 
challenging areas and/or schools. Challenging areas refer to school districts or states (as in 
the US), remote rural areas where recruiting and retaining teachers have been difficult. 
Hard-to-staff schools refer to schools where teacher R&R have been difficult. These 
include, for example, schools in high poverty areas and low performing schools and 
schools where it is particularly difficult to attract and retain certain subjects.
The studies in this review were identified from a search of 13 educational, psycholo-
gical and sociological electronic databases. These included:
● Education Resources Information Clearinghouse
● JSTOR
● The Scholarly Journal Archive
● Social Sciences and Education Full Text
● Web of Science
● Sage
● Science Direct
● Proquest Dissertations and Theses (http://library.dur.ac.uk/record=b2044198~S1)
● British Education Index
● ERIC (Educational Resources Information Centre)
● IBSS (International Bibliography of the Social Sciences)
● Ingenta Journals (full text of a large number of journals)
● EBSCOhost (which covers the following databases: PsychINFO, BEI, PsycARTICLES, 
etc, ProQuest, IBSS
● plus Google and Google Scholar.
These were supplemented by studies known to us and following up on studies in a daisy- 
chain search of relevant studies mentioned in previous systematic reviews.
The search terms included teacher recruitment, teacher retention, teacher shortages, 
teacher supply and policy initiatives, incentives, approaches and schemes (and their 
synonyms). As the purpose of this review was to identify approaches that show evidence 
of impact only studies that employ a causal design were included (see Gorard, 2013 for 
a definition of a causal design). Therefore, the search terms also included any causal term 
(or a synonym) or any research design that would be appropriate for testing a causal 
model, such as experiments, quasi-experiments, regression discontinuity and difference- 
in-difference. A scoping review was first conducted to test out the sensitivity of the search 
terms on well-known sociological, educational and psychological databases to ensure 
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that the search terms picked up relevant pieces of literature and also known studies on 
this topic. Following this, a very general and inclusive statement of search terms was 
generated for each database. These were tested, adjusted and retested iteratively to 
ensure that as little as possible relevant material was missed. We modified the syntax 
for different databases to suit the idiosyncrasies of each, but used similar key words.
To determine the causal evidence of policies and initiatives on teacher recruitment and 
retention, we included only studies using experimental (e.g. randomised control studies) 
or quasi-experimental designs (e.g. regression discontinuity, matched comparison, differ-
ence-in-difference, longitudinal time-series analysis and instrumental variables) and large- 
scale longitudinal studies, or similar.
The scoping review and previous reviews of literature suggested that there were few 
robust experimental evaluations of policy initiatives or approaches for teacher R&R. The 
decision was therefore made to include any empirical studies with at least some type of 
comparative design, but which would have low ratings for trustworthiness in terms of 
causal claims.
The search was limited to studies published or reported in the English language. We 
intentionally did not set any date limits, to keep the search open. To avoid publication 
bias, the search included any material published or unpublished that mentions both 
substantive and causal terms.
A total of 6,708 research reports were identified and exported to EndNote for screen-
ing. This review was completed at the end of 2018 and therefore would not include 
studies that come after 2018.
There is no one definition of teacher retention. While most studies considered retention 
as involving teachers staying within their current school, in others retention referred to 
teachers staying within the school district, the state, state-funded schools, or even within 
teaching as a profession. The same mix appears in claims about teacher wastage in England 
(See & Gorard, 2019). In this review, we included any studies that look at retention of 
teachers regardless of how this is defined.
Screening
Each identified study was first screened to remove duplicates, and for relevance on the basis 
of title and abstract. Only studies that related specifically to recruitment and retention for 
hard-to-staff areas/schools were retained. This process removed 6,161 studies, leaving 547 
which were read in full.
We screened the studies applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Studies were 
included if they were:
● Empirical research
● About activities aimed at attracting people into teaching or about retaining teachers 
in teaching
● Specifically about recruitment and retention of classroom teachers
● About incentives/initiatives/policies or schemes on teacher recruitment and retention
● About mainstream teachers in state-funded/government schools
● Studies that had measurable outcomes (either retention or recruitment)
● Studies that relate to mainstream education
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● Recruitment and retention of traditional shortage subject teachers (e.g. mathe-
matics, science and design and technology)
Studies were excluded if they were:
● Not primary research
● Not published or reported in English
● Not actually a report of research at all
● Simply descriptions of programmes or initiatives with no evaluation
● Not about strategies or approaches to improve recruitment or retention of teachers 
(e.g. observational or correlational studies of factors influencing recruitment and 
retention)
● Studies that have no clear evaluation of outcomes
● Studies with non-tangible or measurable outcomes (e.g. teachers’ attitude or beliefs 
or perceptions)
● Ethnographic studies and narrative case studies
● Opinion pieces, guidance briefs or manuals on how to attract and retain teachers
● Outcome is not teacher recruitment or retention
● Not about recruitment and retention of teachers
● If it is specifically about school leaders, school administrators or teaching assistants
● Outcome is about student achievement (e.g. Cowan & Goldhaber, 2016)
● Not about mainstream teachers, e.g. special education teachers or ethnic minority 
teachers
● Not relevant to the context of English speaking developed countries (e.g. Duflo et al., 
2007)
● Not relevant to the research questions
● Anecdotal accounts from schools about successful strategies
A large number of studies involving surveys or comparisons before and after with no 
comparison groups were eventually excluded because they do not add to the evidence 
base. There were also many studies about recruitment and retention initiatives and what 
some schools or school districts have adopted, but with no evaluation of the outcomes. 
These were excluded.
At this stage the full reports were skim-read by one researcher. A sample of 10 studies 
now thought not to meet the inclusion criteria were then reviewed by the other three 
members of the research team for consensus on their inclusion or exclusion decision.
Only 52 studies deemed to be relevant to the research question were retained.
Data extraction
Key information necessary for strength of evidence assessment was extracted from each of 
the included studies. Such information included the research design, sample size, allocation 
to groups, outcome measures, missing data, methods of analysis and the results. This 
process excluded a further 30 studies. These were narrative discussions of previous research 
or studies that merely asked respondents about strategies they thought worked or were 
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important to them. Three reports were of different approaches to evaluating the same 
intervention by the same set of authors. These were treated as being one report here.
Evidence assessment
In total, 20 reports that were deemed to be both relevant and met our inclusion criteria 
were retained and strength of evidence assessed using the ‘sieve’ (Gorard et al. 2018) – 
a tool for judging the trustworthiness of research findings. This determines how much 
confidence could be placed on the findings, and is a necessary step to ensure that the 
evidence is trustworthy. If public investment is to be made on recruitment and retention 
programmes, it is crucial that the most robust evidence is given the most weight. This 
ensures that the synthesis is not misled by automatically giving equal weighting to good 
and weak studies. This step is important since much of education policy so far has been 
based on incorrect, misleading or incomplete evidence, which probably explains why 
some of the initiatives have not been successful in achieving their objectives.
The strength of evidence was assessed based on five criteria (Table 1): the research 
design (e.g. whether the design was appropriate for a causal claim, such as an RCT with 
random assignment of cases and whether there was a comparator group), scale of the 
study (smallest cell size), level of attrition, validity of outcome measurement (e.g. admin-
istrative data versus teacher self-report) and other threats to validity (conflicts of interest). 
All such factors are important (Slavin & Smith, 2008). Each study was then assigned a score 
between 1* (the minimum standard to be given any weight, including some kind of 
Table 1. Strength of evidence assessment ‘sieve’.
Design Scale Dropout Data quality Threats Rating
Strong design for RQ (e.g. RCT, 
regression discontinuity, 
interrupted time-series)

















Good design for RQ 
(e.g. quasi-experimental 
design with matched 


















Weak design for RQ 
(e.g. poorly matched 
comparators)
















Very weak design for RQ 







High attrition (or 
initial 
imbalance)







No consideration of design 
(no report of comparator)
A trivial scale of 
study, or 
N unclear
Attrition huge or 
not reported




of threats to 
validity
0
6 B. H. SEE ET AL.
comparison) and 4* (the most robust that could be expected in reality). Four-star studies 
are the most secure, meaning that the evidence is most reliable.
We ignored the source of any publication, the reputation of its author/researcher or 
funder as any guarantee of research quality. Instead we judge the strength of evidence for 
each of the included studies by applying the sieve (Table 1). Note that throughout the 
paper we use the phrase ‘quality’ of studies to refer to the quality of evidence in establish-
ing causality and not the quality of research.
The table is to be read from left to right starting with the strongest design, and down 
the row. The strongest evidence (rated 4 star) must have at least one comparison group 
and the groups being compared must be randomly allocated. If the sample size is large 
(this is arbitrary) but around 50–100 cases per group, then it stays as 4*, but if the groups 
are small-medium (i.e. less than 50 in each group) then it drops a star. But if the groups are 
very small e.g. randomly allocating two schools (one to intervention and one to control) it 
drops to 1* since the evidence will not be reliable as the 2 schools may be different in 
unobserved measures. The rating cannot go up the scale.
If the study starts with a large sample and the sample is randomly allocated to two 
groups, it starts with a 4*. If there is a high level of dropout or missing cases it drops to 3*. If 
the attrition is over 25% it drops to 2*. If 50% or more data is missing (e.g. non-response) 
then it will be given 1* as the groups can no longer be regarded as random or equivalent. If 
the study has a large randomly allocated sample with no or small attrition (4*), but the 
outcome is measured based on teachers’ perceptions or teachers’ report of intention to stay 
or leave, it drops to 2* as in reality teachers may or may not stay despite their reported 
intention.
A study that uses two comparable groups which are not randomly allocated, such as 
a difference-in-difference approach (e.g. comparing outcomes before and after interven-
tion in one state in the US with another), will be rated 3*. A star is dropped if the sample is 
small, and two stars if the sample is very small. A further star is dropped if there is high 
attrition. Studies with no comparison groups at all and no before and after comparison 
will be rated 0. These are not discussed in this paper.
To ensure inter-rater reliability in evidence assessment, a sample of 10 studies were 
rated independently by the first three authors. Their ratings were compared and there was 
a 98% agreement. The disagreements were mostly with the 1* and 2* studies. In such 
cases, further reading of the full papers was carried out and discussed before a consensus 
was reached.
We would like to point out that this is a judgement of the trustworthiness of the 
evidence in establishing causal impact and not the quality of research. However good 
a piece of research protocol may be there are always compromises in real life studies. For 
example, interventions or programmes may not go as planned, people drop out or cannot 
be traced or randomisation of cases is not feasible for ethical or logistical reasons. 
Therefore, the ratings here reflect the evidence and not necessarily the quality of work. 
Also, our review aims to answer a causal question so studies using correlational design 
may be of high quality for a different question, but not as suitable for the review because 
it does not answer our research question.
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Synthesis
The research reports were classified according to whether they were about recruitment, 
retention or both, and sorted according to the types of approaches. A broad classification 
of incentives/initiatives was created. These include financial incentives (e.g. signing 
bonuses, wage uplifts, scholarships and loans), other not directly financial incentives 
(e.g. housing benefits, retirements, pension, health care and child care benefits) and 
other non-financial incentives (e.g. alternative routes into teaching, staff development, 
mentoring and induction and workload reduction) or a combination.
Approaches with the most highly rated studies showing positive effects are considered 
the most promising. It has to be made clear that approaches with no evidence of impact 
does not mean that they are not effective, but rather that the existing evidence is such 
that its effectiveness cannot be determined.
The results
The 20 studies reported 26 individual outcomes relevant to either or both the recruitment 
and retention of teachers (Table 2). Most involved some kind of financial incentives, and 
on balance, such approaches appear to work. Many are from the US, while very few are 
from England.
Improving recruitment
Use of financial incentives
All the studies reported for recruitment that met our minimum criteria for inclusion were 
conducted in the US apart from one which was based in Brazil. The stronger studies suggest 
that offering financial incentives appear to work in attracting teachers to hard-to-staff 
schools and areas. Of the nine study outcomes that met at least our minimum criteria for 
a causal claim, three reported positive outcomes for the use of some kind of monetary 
inducements. These three were of a higher quality (i.e. 2* and above). All three were 
relevant to the US context. The highest quality study rated 3* (Hough & Loeb, 2013) showed 
positive outcomes for recruitment (Table 3), but not for retention. Hough and Loeb used 
a difference-in-difference approach to compare the recruitment and retention of 1,611 
applicants in the San Francisco Unified School District which awards higher salaries/bonuses 
to teachers teaching shortage subjects and in schools with a high proportion of poor and 
ethnic minority students with teachers in different school districts before and after the 
introduction of the policy. These teachers were also given a retention bonus if they stayed 
on after four years and more after eight years. The results showed an increase in the 
Table 2. Evidence rating of all included studies on 26 outcomes.
Strength of evidence of study Positive outcome Unclear outcome Negative or neutral outcome
4* - - -
3* 2 - 1
2* 7 - 2
1* 8 4 2
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proportion of shortage subject teachers in hard-to-staff areas from 27% to 37%. There was 
also an increase in the proportion of new hires in the targeted group (those that received 
the incentives) from 49% to 54%. However, there was no difference in the retention rates of 
targeted and non-targeted teachers. Over 90% of teachers stayed on in the district and over 
85% stayed in their school, in both groups. This comparison is difficult because of the 
economic downturn in 2008 when unemployment was high. Such retention bonus might 
be more effective in a more competitive labour market.
The other four lower rating studies were also carried out in the US. The two medium 
strength pieces (2*) also showed positive results for recruitment, but not for retention. 
Steele et al. (2010) evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving 
a 20,000 USD incentive to attract and retain new teachers to low-performing schools for four 
years. Teachers had to repay 5,000 USD for each year that they did not meet the commit-
ment. An instrumental variable design was used, based on 718 GTF teachers, excluding 
those who could not be tracked, were missing data, or not enrolled at recognised institu-
tions. GTF recipients were not randomly selected, and so may have had a predisposition to 
teach in low-performing schools. Twice as many teachers were enrolled during GTF as in the 
years before and after, and 28% more taught in low performing schools. It seemed that 
money was an attractor. However, there was no difference in retention rates (75% over four 
years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause.
Glazerman et al. (2013) examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative, which 
offered bonuses to the highest performing teachers for agreeing to move to and stay in 
low-performing schools. The incentive was 20,000 USD paid in instalments over a two- 
year period. Teachers who were already teaching in low-performing schools received 
a 10,000 USD retention stipend if they remained in the school over the two-year period. 
The participants included 85 teacher pairs matched on school characteristics and rando-
mised to intervention or not, across 114 elementary and middle schools. Because the 
teacher pairs changed their personnel between randomisation and the start of the 
school year, the two groups were no longer equivalent at the beginning of the study. 
Of the vacancies assigned to the scheme, 88% were filled, compared to 44% the year 
before, and 71% in the comparison group. Retention after one year was 93% (70% in the 
comparator group), and 60% after two years (compared to 51%). The results suggest that 
while the transfer incentive may have had a positive impact on teacher recruitment and 
retention during the payout period, the effect did not last once the payment stopped.
The weaker studies (in terms of design for a causal question) are more mixed in results. 
Fowler (2003) examined the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers, 
offering a 20,000 USD bonus for highly qualified people switching careers to teaching. 
Recipients received training before being assigned to high-need schools, and provided 
Table 3. Evidence rating of studies on recruitment.
Strength of evi-
dence of study Positive outcome (n = 5) Unclear outcome (n = 3)
Negative or neutral 
outcome (n = 1)
4* - - -
3* Hough and Loeb (2013) - -
2* Steele et al. (2010), 
Glazerman et al. (2013)
- -
1* Clewell and Villegas (2001), 
Waters-Weller, 2009
Gordon and Vegas (2005), Goldhaber 
et al. (2010), Fowler (2003)
Dwinal (2012)
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with further training, support and mentoring. There was no explicit comparison group. 
The programme failed to recruit candidates from outside the area. Despite advertising 
across states, only seven candidates outside Massachusetts were recruited over four years. 
It could be that other states were also experiencing severe teacher shortages, and were 
offering higher salaries. The programme also failed to place all teachers in high-need 
schools (only 71% from the first cohort, and 48% and 35% in following years). Dropout 
among bonus recipients was higher than the national average (46% by the third year), and 
highest in the high-need districts (55%). A survey of head teachers suggests that bonus 
recipients on the scheme were more attracted to the fast-track scheme than the bonus 
incentive (Churchill et al., 2002). Evaluation of signing bonus incentives in general 
suggests that any effect tends to be short-lived (Choi, 2011).
Goldhaber et al.’s (2010) analysis suggests that teachers will need to be paid more to 
get them to teach and stay in challenging schools. The study compared salaries in private 
and public schools using a combination of administrative datasets. The sample included 
56,354 public school teachers and 10,760 private school teachers. The results showed that 
private schools with a high proportion of poor students paid their teachers 17% higher 
salaries than schools with an average number of poor students. This is more than the 
higher salaries that public school teachers were paid to teach in disadvantaged areas. Of 
course, there are other differences between the two sectors, such as working conditions, 
which should not be ignored.
In a longitudinal retrospective cohort study, Gordon and Vegas (2005) analysed the 
impact of a funding reform in Brazil which stipulated that at least 60% of additional funds 
be allocated to teacher wages. The reform saw an increase in the number of teachers 
(Castro, 1998; World Bank, 2002). However, this study may not be directly relevant to the 
US or UK context as the intervention coincided with major education reforms in Brazil 
which saw additional educational resources for some municipalities and the legislation 
that all teachers must be qualified. It is therefore difficult to attribute any causal effect. 
Before the funding reform there was already an increase in the number of teachers and 
a reduction in student:teacher ratios although not in the poorest areas. The impact of the 
programme is therefore difficult to assess.
Alternative routes into teaching
The evidence for alternative certification to get teachers to teach in hard-to-staff schools or 
areas is unclear. Only two studies met our inclusion criteria and rated at least 1*. Both were 
conducted on the US. The first is a case study of Teach for America (similar to England’s Teach 
First scheme) in the rural Mississippi-Arkansas Delta region, an area of geographical isolation 
and a heavily ethnically segregated school population (Dwinal, 2012). The programme 
recruited high performing university graduates through an intensive selection process. 
Candidates are committed to teach for at least two years in state schools. The low response 
rates (under 20%) to interviews with principals, and a comparison between regions over time 
using the weaker measure of vacancy rates rather than number of teachers recruited, made it 
difficult to establish the impact on recruitment. There was no decrease in vacancy rates 
relative to other areas, partly because the programme imposed limits to the number of 
participants in each district (so directing them elsewhere). Retention rates for Teach for 
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America teachers were also low as suggested by other studies (e.g. Clark et al., 2017; Decker 
et al., 2004; Glazerman et al., 2006, Henry et al., 2014; Raymond et al., 2001).
The second study by Clewell and Villegas (2001) reported positive impact of the 
Pathways to Teaching Careers programme, which included the use of paraprofessionals 
and noncertified teachers, and Peace Corps Fellows. The paraprofessional and noncerti-
fied programmes involved identifying non-qualified staff already working in schools and 
offering them scholarships as well as other support services to help them obtain qualified 
teacher status. The Peace Corps Fellowship identifies and supports potential teachers 
from returning Peace Corps volunteers (similar to the Troops to Teachers programme in 
England). Fellows are placed in schools on a full-time contract and paid a salary where 
they work towards a teaching qualification. This was a six-year study which was largely 
based on self-report, with a high level of missing data. Only 44% reported where they 
were teaching initially, and only 31% after three years. Pathway teachers reported higher 
completion rates than traditionally certified teachers (75% to 60%). A high proportion 
(84%) ended up teaching in hard-to-staff schools and had better retention rates over 
three years compared to the national average (81% to 71%). This could be because 
Pathways teachers had to agree to continue teaching in the schools they were trained 
in for a specified period. Some were also already working in the schools.
Improving working conditions
We found only one study that met our inclusion criteria with minimum 1* rating. In this study, 
Waters-Weller (2009) explored the relationship between retention of teachers and the work-
ing conditions of schools (which they defined as reduction in class size and teaching load, plus 
more planning time) in Virginia, USA. This was an exploratory cross-sectional study looking at 
the relationship between the attitudes of teachers towards low socioeconomic status schools, 
and the kind of incentives likely to increase retention. The survey of 3,525 teachers in two 
urban districts only had a 29% response rate. The majority of teachers indicated that they 
would stay in their current school for the next year, including those who were in high poverty 
schools. They generally indicated that extra money for salaries and bonuses were not 
necessarily needed to keep them if the school had an excellent administrator, but money 
was an inducement to transfer to a poor school. The design of the study could not establish 
a causal link between improvement in working conditions or retention bonuses on retention, 
hence it was rated only 1* for strength of evidence.
Improving retention
There were 17 studies that examined the impact on teacher retention. Again, none were 
of the highest quality. All the stronger studies were conducted in the US and rated 2* and 
above suggested no lasting benefit from financial incentives for retention of teachers in 
hard-to-staff schools (e.g. Hough & Loeb, 2013; Steele et al., 2010; Glazerman et al., 2013; 
Fowler, 2003). These have been discussed under recruitment (above section). A further 11 
studies dealt solely or mostly with retention of teachers in hard-to-staff schools (Table 4) 
all reported positive effects.
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Use of financial incentives
Although Clotfelter et al. (2008), a 3* study, indicated a positive effect of financial incentives 
on retention, it concurred with the other studies above that incentives work only as long as 
they are available and once removed, they have no lasting effect. Clotfelter et al. (2008) 
examined the impact of the North Carolina annual bonus scheme on the retention of 
qualified mathematics, science and special education teachers in high poverty and challen-
ging schools, using a difference-in-difference approach. Teachers received the bonus 
($1,800 per year) for as long as they stayed in the eligible school. This was a reasonably well- 
conducted study, using administrative data for four years on public school teachers to 
estimate the likelihood of teachers leaving a particular school. The research compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme, eligible and 
ineligible teachers in the same schools, teachers in eligible schools and those in schools that 
narrowly missed out on being eligible. Teachers receiving the bonus were an estimated 15% 
less likely to leave at the end of the school year compared to other teachers in the same 
schools.
The other 2* studies suggested positive impact on teacher retention, but those from the 
US often involved a tie-in where teachers are committed to staying on if they receive the 
financial incentives. Fitzgerald (1986) looked at offering an annual stipend (of between 500 
USD and 2,000 USD) to encourage teachers to teach in schools with a high proportion of 
pupils eligible for free or reduced lunches, in high priority areas in the US. The study used 
a difference-in-difference approach to compare the retention rates of teachers in 25 high 
priority schools with 25 high poverty control schools not receiving the stipend. The groups 
were similar in terms of pupil and teacher characteristics. Vacancies dropped in treatment 
schools in the first year, and the fall in retention rates was lower than for control schools 
(ES = +0.39).
In Norway, Falch (2010) examined the impact on the retention of teachers in high- 
vacancy schools of paying teachers differential wages, using a difference-in-difference 
approach. In the period 1993/4 to 2002/3, Norway had a central wage system, but 
teachers in schools with high vacancies received a wage premium of between 7.5% and 
12%. Over the nine years, schools were initially eligible if they had 20% more ‘shortages’ 
than the previous year. This increased to 30% for the 1996/7 and 1997/8, and then back to 
20% for the last four years. In total, 161 schools received the wage premium at least once, 
Table 4. Evidence rating of studies on retention.
Strength of 
evidence of 
study Positive outcome (n = 12)
Unclear out-
come (n = 1)
Negative or neutral 
outcome (n = 4)
4 - - -
3 Clotfelter et al. (2008) - Hough and Loeb 
(2013)
2 Fulbeck (2011), Fulbeck and Richards (2015), Fulbeck (2014), 
Fitzgerald (1986), Falch (2010), Feng and Sass (2018), 
Gold (1987)
- Steele et al. (2010), 
Glazerman et al. 
(2013)
1 Anthony (2009), Colson and Satterfield (2018), Fuller (2003), 
Goldhaber et al. (2010), Helfeldt et al. (2009), Lyons (2007)
Fowler, (2003) Waters-Weller (2009)
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and in these schools the attrition rate of teachers was lower than comparison schools by 
6%. The reporting of this study, however, was not clear, and the number of schools and 
teachers included varied considerably over time. This makes it difficult to judge the 
efficacy of the incentive.
Feng and Sass (2018) considered the effects of the Florida Critical Teacher Shortage 
Program 1986 to 2011, on the retention of teachers in shortage subject areas (mathe-
matics, science and special education). Early career teachers were offered loan forgiveness 
of up to 10,000 USD to pay off their student loan but only if they taught in a shortage 
subject for at least 90 days. There was a recruitment bonus for new teachers, of up to 
1,200 USD (to cover removals or equipment), and a retention bonus of up to £1,200 if 
teachers continued to teach a shortage subject the next year. Since subjects designated as 
shortage changed over time, the teachers eligible for these incentives also changed over 
time. These variations were used to compare bonus recipients with non-recipients, in 
terms of recruitment and attrition using a proportional hazard model, taking into account 
student demographics, pupil prior behaviour, prior achievement, class size, teacher 
gender, race/ethnicity, salary base and experience. Loan forgiveness reportedly had 
a positive effect on the likelihood of teachers staying in teaching the following year, 
reducing attrition by 12%. The one-time retention bonus for shortage subject teachers 
also reduced the likelihood of teachers leaving by 25%, but not once funding was 
removed.
Three studies have common authors and so they are treated as one complex study. 
Fulbeck (2011) evaluated the impact of ProComp (Professional Compensation for 
Teachers) – a teacher incentive programme in Denver – including 10 financial incentives. 
School-based incentives were awarded to teachers who teach at schools serving low- 
income students and high performing schools and schools that make the most progress 
in mathematics and reading. Eligibility was restricted to those who were members of 
teacher unions not working in Charter schools. The total number of teachers included in 
the retention analyses was 4,145, representing 91% of all Denver Public School District 
teachers. This study employed interrupted time-series and difference-in-difference regres-
sion models. The average change in retention rate was −0.06% before ProComp and 
+1.5% afterwards, and participation in ProComp increased retention rates by 2.1 percen-
tage points. It was more effective in hard-to-staff schools (ES 0.25) compared to others (ES 
0.08). Retention was higher in high poverty schools where teachers were eligible to 
receive a financial incentive to stay.
Fulbeck and Richards (2015) looked at all 7,333 public school teachers in Denver from 
2006 to 2010 who were eligible for the ProComp incentive (regardless of whether they did 
receive it) and who made at least one voluntary move within the district (989). The incentive 
tended to attract teachers to high growth and high performing schools, and was less 
successful for schools with a high proportion of low income pupils. A limitation of the 
study is its inability to take account of other factors that may over-estimate the effect of 
financial incentives, such as principal’s hiring preferences and the actual school vacancies 
advertised.
Fulbeck (2014) looked at participation in ProComp and teacher mobility in high 
poverty areas, using longitudinal teacher-level data from 2001/2 to 2010/11, and compar-
ing teachers who received ProComp with those who did not, and those who taught in 
high poverty schools with those who did not. Teachers working in high poverty schools 
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were more likely to move but the odds of leaving the district (and so losing the incentive) 
were lower for ProComp teachers than for others. The study suggests that the incentive 
alone was not enough to compensate for poor working conditions, issues with school 
leadership and school climate.
The 1* study, Colson and Satterfield (2018) tested the effects of a teacher compensa-
tion plan, known as the Innovation Acceleration Fund, on the retention of SEN (special 
educational needs), mathematics, science and language teachers in a small rural district. 
This was a merit pay system, paying teachers deemed effective based on the contentious 
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System. The total potential population was reported 
as 134. Of these, 93 volunteered for the compensation scheme. Teachers who did not 
want to have individual teacher effect results were excluded. Only 56 of these were 
deemed effective. Around 80% of teachers who participated in the compensation scheme 
were retained compared to 70% who did not participate. The report does not include 
effect sizes, and the design means that volunteers were compared with non-volunteers, 
hence the 1*.
Mentoring, support and induction
Five studies looked at the impact of some kind of early support system for new teachers, 
either through mentoring, induction or teacher preparation. All reported positive results 
for retention, but they were all lower quality studies rated 1* (with only one rated 2* – 
Gold, 1987). The effectiveness of such programmes therefore cannot be determined.
Gold (1987) evaluated the New York City Retired-Teachers-as-Mentors Program by 
comparing mentees with a comparison group of non-mentored teachers. The programme 
recruited retired teachers as mentors for new in-service teachers. The study used Board of 
Education records and questionnaires completed by teachers, mentors and principals. The 
results showed that retention rates went up for all, but the rates were higher for the 
mentored teachers (85% and 80% in the second year). It is not clear whether mentors 
were randomised to new teachers in eligible schools, and no account was taken of missing 
data in the analysis.
An evaluation of a mandatory mentoring system for new teachers in a rural school district 
in North Carolina (Anthony, 2009) reported an increase in teacher retention (defined as the 
proportion of teachers retuning each year to the school system). Both mentors and mentees 
were given training. Data on retention was taken from the school system database. The 
proportion of teachers returning to the school system increased each year from 84% in 
2005/6 before the programme to 92% in 2007/8. There was, however, no counterfactual as 
part of this study, and it is therefore a very weak study for a causal question.
Positive results on retention were also reported for a statewide program known as the 
Texas Beginning Educator Support programme which offers instructional support and 
mentoring for beginning teachers (Fuller, 2003). Although this was a state-wide pro-
gramme, participation was selective, and it is unclear how selection was organised. 
Using the state personnel database, the study compared the retention rates of beginning 
teachers who participated in the scheme with those not participating, from 1999/2000 to 
2002/03. The participants had higher retention, but this could be at least partly due to the 
prior selection process.
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Helfeldt et al. (2009) described a four-year internship programme aimed at retaining new 
teachers in high-need urban schools. Interns were paid, with full teacher benefits, and 
worked as full-time regular teachers in the classroom. They were assigned an approved 
trained mentor, and 8,000 USD from the intern’s salary was paid towards this mentoring 
scheme. The sample only included 38 interns and 8 mentors, and the bulk of the analysis 
concerned participant perceptions of the programme. The programme was reported as 
effective in retaining teachers in high-need urban schools with 100% of teachers staying on 
in teaching one year later, compared to state retention of 81%.
In another study, also based in the US, Lyons (2007) evaluated a teacher preparation 
programme where participants were volunteers, selected for their commitment to the 
goals of the programme. Unfortunately, much of the reporting is unclear. Findings 
suggest that teachers exposed to all programme components were less likely than the 
national average to leave classroom teaching after a year in a high poverty school.
Discussion
What is the most promising approach to recruiting and retaining teachers in hard- 
to-staff schools/areas?
Most of the work described here concerns financial incentives of some kind. Looking at 
the number of positive studies with higher evidence rating, financial incentives appear to 
be a promising approach in recruiting teachers. Offering remission of student loans, 
higher salaries or premiums for teaching in hard-to-staff areas and schools is effective in 
attracting teachers. However, it is not clear that such external motivation is desirable, or 
attracts the best teachers, and it is quite clear that the attraction is not lasting.
The stronger studies indicate that financial incentives are effective in retaining teachers 
in hard-to-staff areas, but only when there is a kind of tie-in involved where teachers are 
committed to staying on in the school or district for a specified period or else incur 
a penalty. The impact disappears once the incentive is removed. For example, in the US 
retention is associated with receipt of the incentive (e.g. Clotfelter et al., 2008; Glazerman 
et al., 2013; Hough & Loeb, 2013; Steele et al., 2010) and teachers are committed to stay in 
the challenging school/area or continue teaching shortage subjects for a specified period. 
In Norway, teachers in high vacancy schools receive a wage premium, but lose this once 
they move to a low vacancy school. In contrast, recruitment and retention schemes in the 
UK often do not have such stipulations. This is probably why bursary schemes, for 
example, have not been successful (Worth et al., 2018). The DfE’s own analysis suggests 
that the proportion of bursary holders in state-funded teaching was lower than non- 
bursary holders. It has to be mentioned that bursary holders are trainees in shortage 
subjects while non-bursary holders are not. This indicates that the busaries are not 
attracting shortage subject teachers to state-funded schools. To address this, the govern-
ment is piloting a phased bursary for mathematics teacher trainees with a lower bursary 
upfront and two additional years of payments once in teaching to encourage them to stay 
in teaching for at least two years after they qualify (DfE, 2019a, 2019b). We do not yet 
know if this strategy works and if the amount of the incentive is sufficient to keep 
beginning shortage subject teachers in teaching in challenging schools.
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The use of financial incentives is usually premised on the assumption that if sufficiently 
well compensated, people can be enticed to go into teaching or be persuaded to stay on in 
teaching. The evidence in this review suggests that on its own monetary inducements are 
clearly not enough to keep teachers in challenging schools or in difficult areas.
The question is how much is enough to compensate for working in these 
challenging schools and areas
DeFeo et al. (2016) estimated that the differential to compensate for factors that might 
make a community or school more or less attractive ranged from 0.85 to 2.01, with remote 
rural communities having higher differentials. Other studies suggest that such salary 
compensation only had a short-term effect (Bueno & Sass, 2016). Working and living 
conditions, and a lack of community engagements were reported to be important factors 
in teachers’ decision to stay or leave (Fulbeck, 2014; Goldhaber et al., 2010; Waters-Weller, 
2009). It therefore behoves that such financial compensations should be accompanied by 
improvements in the working conditions for their effects to be sustained.
Is there evidence that approaches other than financial incentives work  
in recruiting and retaining teachers in challenging schools?
There is no good evidence yet that other approaches such as mentoring and induction, 
teacher development and alternative routes into teaching work for recruitment and 
retention, in high-need areas. The evidence for these programmes is mixed and unclear. 
The strongest studies find little or no impact. The positive studies often have a mix of 
activities in the intervention making it difficult to attritbute support as the active ingre-
dient in any success, and some have intention outcomes (rather than actual figures on 
attrition).
A number of studies also looked at ‘grow your own’ (training and the recruiting from 
local community), but none of these could establish causation. Almost all these studies 
were based on stakeholders’ anecdotal reports of successful practice in their own school 
or district. Most of the research we found was very weak in design, and all of the stronger 
evidence work involved easier-to-measure, more concrete strategies (such as financial 
incentives). The absence of evidence should not be taken as evidence of absence. What is 
needed now is for research in this area to use stronger designs that can address the causal 
answers to these questions.
Conclusion
More research with the kind of designs needed to address causal issues is urgently 
required to cover mentoring, support, training for teaching in difficult schools, and 
a host of other alternative approaches that could be combined with financial interven-
tions to attract good teachers and then keep them where they are needed most. In the 
medium to longer-term a more comprehensive approach would be to change school 
allocation and economic policies so that there were no longer such clearly defined schools 
and areas with high levels of poverty (Gorard, 2018), meaning that these schools would 
not be as hard to staff, even though some would remain geographically isolated.
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We recognise that in any review of this scale some studies may have been missed, and 
new and more robust studies may be conducted in the future. This may alter the findings 
of our review, but given the evidence available at the time of this review the strongest 
evidence is for financial incentives.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
The project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/R007349/1].
Notes on contributors
Beng Huat See is Associate Professor at Durham University. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education 
Academy, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and the Wolfson Research Institute for Health and 
Wellbeing. Her research expertise is in the synthesis of research evidence and evaluations of 
education programmes and government policies.
Stephen Gorard is Professor of Education and Public Policy, and Fellow of the Wolfson Research 
Institute at Durham University, and Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Birmingham. 
His work concerns the robust evaluation of education as a lifelong process, focused on issues of 
equity and effectiveness.
Rebecca Morris is a lecturer at the University of Warwick. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education 
Academy. Her research interests are in education and social policy, teacher education, widening 
participation and assessment.
Nada El Soufi is a lecturer in English language in Lebanon. Her research interest is in developing 
critical thinking in young people. Her expertise is in conducting systematic reviews and randomised 
control trials.
ORCID




Anthony, J. (2009). Teacher retention: Program evaluation of a beginning teacher and mentor program 
[Education theses, dissertations and projects, paper 100].
Beesley, A., Atwill, K., Blair, P., & Barley, Z. (2010). Strategies for recruitment and retention of 
secondary teachers in central U.S. rural schools. Rural Educator, 31(2), 1–9.
Boffey, D., & Helm, T. (2015, August 29). Shortage of teachers set to spark new schools crisis. The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/aug/29/shortage-teachers-new- 
schools-crisis-uk-trainee-shortfall
Bueno, C., & Sass, T. R. (2016). The efffects of differential pay on teacher recruitment, retention and 
quality. Department of Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Georgia State 
University.
OXFORD REVIEW OF EDUCATION 17
Castro, J. (1998). The maintenance and development of teaching and appreciation of the Magisterium 
(FUNDEF) and its impact on financing of elementary school. http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/ 
11058/2720
Choi, J. (2011). When are signing bonuses more than just ‘pay to play’? An experimental investiga-
tion. ProQuest Information and Learning, 72, 3811.
Churchill, A., Berger, J., Brooks, C., Effrat, A., Grifin, L., Magouirk-Colbert, M., McDermott, K., 
Sharick, R., & Sheehan, A. (2002). Revised interim report: The Massachusetts institute for new 
teachers and master teacher/NBPTS programs. Center for Education Policy—University of 
Massachusetts.
Clark, M. A., Isenberg, E., Liu, A. Y., Makowsky, L., & Zukiewicz, M. (2017). Impacts of the teach for 
America investing in innovation scale-up. Mathematica Policy Research.
Clewell, B. C., & Villegas, A. M. (2001). Evaluating the pathways to teaching careers program. Absence 
unexcused: Ending teacher shortages in high-need areas. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
Clotfelter, C., Glennie, E., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2008). Teacher bonuses and teacher retention in low- 
performing schools: Evidence from the North Carolina $1800 teacher bonus program. Public 
Finance Review, 36(1), 63–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142106291662
Colson, T., & Satterfield, C. (2018). The effects of strategic compensation on teacher retention. Power 
and Education, 10(1), 92–104. https://doi.org/10.1177/1757743818758782
Cowan, J., & Goldhaber, D. (2016). National Board Certification and Teacher Effectiveness: Evidence 
From Washington State. Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 9(3),233-258.
Decker, P. T., Mayer, D. P., & Glazerman, S. (2004). The effects of teach for America on students: 
Findings from a national evaluation. University of Wisconsin-Madison. Institute for Research on 
Poverty.
DeFeo, D. J., Hirshberg, D., & Hill, A. (2016) t’s more than just dollars: Problematizing salary as the sole 
mechanisms for recruiting and retaining teachers in rural Alaska [Paper presentation] Wellness and 
healing: Indigenous innovation and alaska native research proceedings from the alaska native 
studies conference.
DeLaat, J., & Vegas, E. (2005). Do differences in teacher contracts affect student performance? Evidence 
from togo. mimeo, Harvard University and The World Bank.
DfE. (2018). Destinations of trainee teachers awarded a bursary.
DfE. (2019a). Cash incentives for maths and physics teachers.
DfE. (2019b). Supporting early career teachers. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sup 
porting-early-career-teachers/supporting-early-career-teachers#the-early-career-framework
Dwinal, M. (2012). Teach for America and rural southern teacher labour supply: An exploratory case 
study of teach for America as a supplement to teacher labour policies in the Mississippi-Arkansas 
delta, 2008-2010 [PhD thesis]. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ec68169b-bf6c-4659-82a9- 
3fe8be3fa883
Esther, D., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. (2007). Monitoring works: Getting teachers to come to school. 
forthcoming, American Economic Review.
European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice. (2018). Teaching careers in Europe: Access, progression and 
support. Eurydice report Publications Office of the European Union
Falch, T. (2010). Teacher mobility responses to wage changes: Evidence from a quasi-natural 
experiment. Working paper series 10910. Department of Economics, Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.3.460
Feng, L., & Sass, T. (2018). The impact of incentives to recruit and retain teachers in “hard-to-staff” 
subjects. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 37(1), 112–135. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam. 
22037
Fitzgerald, C. (1986). Report on the high priority location stipend program. Dade County Public 
Schools Office of Educational Accountability. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED283862
Foster, D. (2019). Teacher recruitment and retention in England. House of commons briefing paper 
#7222. House of Commons Library.
Fowler, R. (2003). The Massachusetts signing bonus program for new teachers: A model of teacher 
preparation worth? Education Analysis Archives, 11(13), 1–24.
18 B. H. SEE ET AL.
Fulbeck, E. (2011). Teacher retention: Estimating and understanding the effects of financial incentives in 
Denver. ProQuest LLC. https://scholar.colorado.edu/educ_gradetds/100/
Fulbeck, E. (2014). Teacher mobility and financial incentives: A descriptive analysis of Denver’s 
ProComp. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 36(1), 67–82. https://doi.org/10.3102/ 
0162373713503185
Fulbeck, E., & Richards, M. (2015). The impact of school-based financial incentives on teachers’ 
strategic moves. Teachers College Record, 117, 9.
Fuller, E. (2003). Beginning teacher retention rates for TxBESS and non-TXBESS teachers unpublished 
[Unpublished]. State Board for Education Certification, Texas.
Garcia, E., & Weiss, E. (2019, March 26). The teacher shortage real, large and growing, and worse than 
we thought. Economic Policy Institute. https://www.epi.org/publication/the-teacher-shortage-is- 
real-large-and-growing-and-worse-than-we-thought-the-first-report-in-the-perfect-storm-in-the- 
teacher-labor-market-series/
Glazerman, S., Mayer, D., & Decker, P. (2006). Alternative routes to teaching: The impacts of Teach 
For America on student achievement and other outcomes. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 25,1(1), 75–96. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20157
Glazerman, S., Protik, A., Teh, B., Bruch, J., Max, J., & Warner, E. (2013). Transfer incentives for 
high-performing teachers: Final results from a multisite randomized experiment. Executive 
summary (NCEE 2014-4004). National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 
Institute of Education Sciences, US Department of Education.
Gold, M. (1987). Retired teachers as consultants to new teachers: A new inservice teacher traning model 
(Final report, American Association of State Colleges and Universities). Institute for Research and 
Development in Occupation Education.
Goldhaber, D., Destler, K., & Player, D. (2010). Teacher labor markets and the perils of using hedonics 
to estimate compensating differentials in the public sector. Economics of Education Review, 29(1), 
1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.07.010
Gorard, S. (2013). Research design: Creating robust approaches for the social sciences. SAGE.
Gorard, S. (2018). Education policy, equity and effectiveness: Evidence of equity and effectiveness. 
Policy Press.
Gorard, S. (2018). Education policy: Evidence of equity and effectiveness. Policy Press.
Gorard, S., See, B. H., & Siddiqui, N. (2017). The trials of evidence-based education: The promises, 
opportunities and problems of trials in education. Routledge.
Gordon, N., & Vegas, E. (2005). Educational finance equalization, spending, teacher student out-
comes: The case of Brazil’s FUNDEF. In Vegas, Ed. Incentives to improve teaching: Lessons from Latin 
America. World Bank Press.
Hazell, W. (2016, December 1). Exclusive: DfE abandons National Teaching Service. TES. https://www. 
tes.com/news/exclusive-dfe-abandons-national-teaching-service
Hazell, W. (2018, April 6). Exclusive: England needs 47,000 extra secondary teachers. TES. https:// 
www.tes.com/news/exclusive-england-needs-47000-extra-secondary-teachers
Helfeldt, J., Capraro, R., Caparo, M., Foster, E., & Carter, N. (2009). An urban schools’ university 
partnership that prepares and retains high quality teachers for “high need schools”. The Teacher 
Educator, 44(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/08878730802520050
Henry, G. T., Purtell, K. M., Bastian, K. C., Fortner, K. C., Thompson, C. L., Campbell, S. L., & 
Patterson, K. M. (2014). The effects of teacher entry portals on student achievement. Journal of 
Teacher Education, 65(1), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022487113503871
Hough, H., & Loeb, S. (2013). Can a district-level teacher salary incentive policy improve teacher 
recruitment and retention? Policy Brief 13-4, Policy Analysis for California Education, PACE. 
https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/PACE%20Policy%20Brief%2013-4_LowRes.pdf
House of Commons. (2017). Recruitment and retention of teachers fifth report of session 2016-2017. 
HCC 199.
Lyons, K. (2007). Preparing to stay: A quantitative examination of the effects of pre -service prepara-
tion on the retention of urban educators (Vol. 3295729, 171). University of California, Los 
Angeles.
OXFORD REVIEW OF EDUCATION 19
Navarro, C., & Verdisco, A. (2000). Teacher training in Latin America: Innovations and trends, 
Sustainable development department technical paper series. Washington: Inter-American 
Development Bank.
Raymond, M., Fletcher, S. H., & Luque, J. (2001). Teach for America: An evaluation of teacher differences 
and student outcomes in Houston. Stanford University.
See, B. H., & Gorard, S. (2019). Why don’t we have enough teachers?: A reconsideration of the available 
evidence. Research papers in education. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 
02671522.2019.1568535
Sibieta, L. (2018). The teacher labour market in England: Shortages, subject expertise and incentives. 
Education Policy Institute.
Sky News. (2017, February 21). ‘Teacher supply crisis’ hitting schools in England. Sky News. https:// 
news.sky.com/story/england-schools-suffering-from-teacher-supply-crisis-report-claims 
-10776066
Slavin, R., & Smith, D. (2008). Effects of sample size on effect size in systematic reviews in education. 
Paper presented at the annual meetings of the society for research on effective education, crystal 
city, Virginia, March 3-4, 2008
Social Mobility Commission. (2017). State of the nation 2017: Social mobility in Britain. https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662744/ 
State_of_the_Nation_2017_-_Social_Mobility_in_Great_Britain.pdf
Steele, J., Murnane, R., & Willett, J. (2010). Do financial incentives help low-performing schools 
attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from California. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 29(3), 451–478. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20505
Sutcher, L., Darling-Hammond, L., & Carver-Thomas, D. (2016). A coming crisis in teaching? Teacher, 
supply, demand and shortages in the U.S. Learning Policy Institute.
TES Global. (2019). In-school effort to solve teacher crisis as shortage hits 50,000. Online newsletter. 
https://www.fenews.co.uk/press-releases/35537-in-school-effort-to-solve-teacher-crisis-as- 
shortage-hits-50000
Vegas, E. (2007). Teacher labor markets in developing countries. The Future of Children, 17(1), 
219–232. https://doi.org/10.1353/foc.2007.0011
Waters-Weller, C. (2009). Attracting veteran teachers to low socioeconomic status schools: Initiatives 
and considerations, US. ProQuest Information and Learning, 69, 2979.
Wheeler, J., & Glennie, E. (2007). Can pay incentives improve the recruitment of teachers in America’s 
hard-to-staff schools? A research summary: Policy matters Center for Child and Family Policy, Duke 
University.
World Bank. (2002). Brazil municipal education, resources, incentives, and results. http://documents. 
worldbank.org/curated/en/969591468016270639/Research-report
Worth, J., Lynch, S., Hillary, J., Rennie, C., & Andrade, J. (2018). Teacher workforce dynamics in England. 
NFER.
20 B. H. SEE ET AL.
